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1Abstract
In this paper, I present empirical evidence for …ve European countries
(Germany, France, UK, Spain and Italy) and the Euro-zone on whether mon-
etary policy shocks produce di¤erent e¤ects on real output growth depending
on the phase of the business cycle that the economy is undergoing (the so-
called ‘state’ asymmetry). To do so, I apply a multivariate extension of the
Hamilton(1989)’s Markov switching methodology. I …nd evidence in favour
of ‘state’ asymmetries at the aggregate level in all the countries whereby
interest-rate shocks have larger e¤ects in recessions than in expansions. I
also carry out the analysis at the sectorial level and observe that this asym-
metric e¤ect seems to be di¤erent in the analysed countries when I focus on
a sectorial analysis.
JEL Classi…cation: C32, D92, E52, E58
Keywords: monetary policy, Taylor rule, asymmetries, Generalised Method
of the Moments and Markov switching models
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main goal of this paper is to analyse how monetary policy a¤ects real
activity depending on the state of the economy, in …ve European countries
(Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain) and the Euro-zone.
For this purpose, I follow Ravn and Sola(1996), Garcia and Schaller(1995),
Kakes(2000), Dolado and Maria-Dolores(2001) and Peersman and Smets(2000)
in applying the Hamilton(1989)’s Markov Switching methodology (MS hence-
forth) to endogenously determine from the data the dating and the transition
probabilities from one cyclical phase to another in multivariate models with
regime shifts, where output growth is allowed to depend on shocks to mon-
etary policy rule. The use of the MS methodology is appropriate to analyze
the cyclical e¤ects of a monetary policy in these European countries since,
unlike what happens with the NBER dating for the US cycle, an o¢cial dat-
ing for the cycle is not yet available. Hence, the MS approach will allow
me to examine an interesting number of questions such as whether mone-
tary policy shocks have di¤erent e¤ects on output depending on the phase in
which the change in monetary policy took place or whether changes in the
monetary policy stance are also able to alter the transition probabilities from
a recession to a boom and conversely. The MS approach has also been used
in Peersman and Smets(2000) to analyse this issue on the output growth
but they take an Euro area-wide approach considering a common cycle in
seven European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium
a n dt h eN e t h e r l a n d s )a n da n a l y s et h ee ¤ e c t so fa na r e a - w i d em o n e t a r yp o l -
icy shock on output in all the countries. In this paper I prefer to consider
a country-by-country analysis because the evidence on a common cycle in
3Europe is rather inconclusive and also because no assumption on common
monetary policy shocks would be necessary in this case. All the literature
on the European business cycle seems to agree that if a European business
cycle exists, among the continental countries, it is with the UK cycle being
considerably out of phase with the continental one.1
Although it has received far less attention in the literature, there are many
theoretical contributions that provide the microfoundations of this asymme-
try. I …nd at least two justifying arguments for it. Firstly, the price adjust-
ment models leading to a convex aggregate supply curve.2 This implication
could be re-interpreted as implying that monetary policy will have stronger
real e¤ects during recessions, when output is below its long-run level, than
in expansions, when the aggregate supply curve is almost vertical. Secondly,
there is a broad class of models which provide support for the ‘state’ asym-
metry by explicitly modelling the credit or lending channel of the monetary
transmission mechanism. According to this interpretation, if …nancial mar-
kets face information asymmetries, credit and liquidity may be readily avail-
able in booms whilst agents may …nd it harder to obtain funds in recessions.
Therefore, it is likely that monetary policy will have stronger e¤ects on the
consumption and investment decisions during recessions than during expan-
sions. This is the mechanism derived from the extensive research on …nancial
market imperfections, including agency costs and debt overhang models, de-
1For more detailed arguments in favour of an individual analysis see Artis and
Zhang(1997, 1999).
2Ball and Romer (1989), Caballero and Engel (1992) and Tsiddon (1991), inter alia,
have analysed S-s type price adjustment rules which lead to convex aggregate supply
curves.
4veloped, inter alia, by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Gertler (1988), Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1998) and Lamont (1993).
The contribution of this study may be interesting for three reasons: (i)
Some European …nancial markets have been less developed over the sample
period than in the US and, in this sense, we can obtain a good illustration
of economies where the factors highlighted by the credit channel might be
operative, (ii) the analysis at the sectorial level may be useful as it helps
to ascertain which sectors are more important in explaining the aggregate
results and which behave in a di¤erent way in each country, and (iii) the
response in this …ve countries in our sample and the Euro-zone might have
been di¤erent.
To measure the stance of monetary policy I estimate monetary policy
reaction functions for …ve central banks: the Bundesbank,t h eBanque de
France,t h eBank of England,t h eBanco de España,t h eBanca di Italia and
the (surrogate) European Central Bank using quarterly data. The sample
periods have been determined on the basis of choosing homogeneous spells
where there was a virtually autonomous control over domestic monetary
policy in each case. So, they correspond to 1978(1)-1998(4) for Germany,
1978(1)-1998(4) for France, 1978(2)-1998(4) for England, 1977(4)-1998(4)
for Spain and 1982(2)-1998(4) for Italy. Finally, I will carry out a similar
exercise for the Euro-zone area using country weighted quarterly data for
the Member states which has been constructed by Fagan et al.(2000) over
the period 1984(1) to 2001(2). As for the short-term interest rates, they are
chosen as follows: (i) the three-month interbank market rate in Germany,
France and Italy, (ii) the marginal intervention rate of the Bank of England
5and the Bank of Spain and (iii) a weighted average of short-term intervention
rates for the Euro-zone countries.
My analysis is executed in two steps. First, I estimate reaction func-
tions using a generalised Taylor rule speci…cation. Second, once the interest
rate shocks have been obtained from the Central Banks´reaction functions,
I observe whether there are asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy on out-
put growth, both at the aggregate and the sectorial level(only for the …ve
countries), depending on the business cycle phase that the economy was un-
dergoing at the time the shock took place.
Proceeding in this way I obtain two interesting results: (i) I …nd evidence
in favour of ‘state’ asymmetries at the aggregate level in the …ve European
countries and the Euro-zone, whereby interest rate shocks have larger e¤ects
in recessions than in expansions, and (ii) I observe that the previous asym-
metries seem to be di¤erent in the …ve analysed countries when I proceed to
do a sectorial analysis.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I estimate
forward-looking monetary policy reaction functions for …ve central banks.
Section 3 o¤ers a brief explanation of the MS methodology which is used
throughout the rest of the paper and presents the results for the aggregate
and sectorial GDP in a model with constant transition probabilities. Section
4 relaxes the previous assumption by allowing the transition probabilities to
be a¤ected by monetary policy shocks in a direct way. Finally, section 5
draws some conclusions.
62 Estimation of central banks´reaction
functions
In this section I estimate a linear `forward-looking’ Taylor rule following the
arguments in Svensson (1997), and Clarida et al (1998, 1999).3
As can be observed in Clarida et al(1998) the …rst order necessary condi-
tions for a symmetric loss function in the central bank preferences yield the
following policy reaction function:
i
¤





which, under the assumption that central banks smooth interest rate changes
by adopting an AR(1) partial adjustment rule, derives:4
it = ½it¡1 +( 1¡ ½)i
¤
t; (2)
Hence, the estimable speci…cation of the Taylor rule is the following:
it = ½it¡1 +( 1¡ ½)
©








where Xt denotes a set of observable variables, besides in‡ation and output
gaps, that may potentially a¤ect interest rate setting independently of their
3Svensson(1999) and Svensson and Woodford(1999) also discuss how in‡ation-forecast
targeting can be interpreted as a ‘targeting rule’ and is di¤erent from a commitment to a
simple ”instrument rule” like a Taylor rule.
4See Goodfriend(1991) and Sack(1997).
7role in helping to forecast the above-mentioned variables. They include, for
instance, variations in real exchange rate, foreign interest rate and the evolu-
tion of the money supply. Notice that, by exploiting the rational hypothesis
in expectation formation I can replace forecast variables by their realized
values so that the error term follows the stochastic process:





where »t is an i:i:d disturbance, e¼
t+k=t ´ ¼t+k¡E(¼t+k) is the k-period ahead
forecast error for in‡ation and e
y
t+p=t ´ yt+p ¡ E(yt+p) is the corresponding
p-period ahead forecast error for the output gap5. Finally, let zt be a vector
of variables within the central bank’s information set, such as lagged vari-
ables that help forecast in‡ation and output or any other contemporaneous
variables that are uncorrelated with the policy rule shock, "t: Then, the Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM) can be used to estimate the parameter
vector in (1), (2) and (3) by exploiting the set of orthogonality conditions.
E("t=zt)=0 : (5)
Further, since the composite disturbance has an MA(max{k,p}-1)r e p r e s e n -
tation due to the overlapping nature of the forecast errors, the weighting
var-cov matrix used to implement GMM is the one proposed by Newey and
5Note that equation (1) is derived when the monetary authorities commit to a state
contingent sequence of short-term interest rates in order to minimize an intertemporal loss
function. In this framework it is supposed that interest rate a¤ects output with p-period
lag and a¤ects in‡ation with a k-period lag. For a detailed description see Svensson(1997)
and Clarida et al(1998,1999)
8West (1987). Moreover, Hansen (1982)’s J test is used to test the overiden-
ti…cation restrictions.
To obtain a measure of output gap, I detrend the Gross Domestic Product
using the Hodrick-Prescott(HP) …lter.6 As regards the in‡ation target, ¼¤; I
depart from the assumption that it is constant, as in Clarida et al.(1997) and
assume instead that it has a time variation. I follow Dolado, Maria-Dolores
and Naveira(2000), according to the next two considerations: (i) in the case
of Germany, I take the in‡ation target established in o¢cial reports,7 and
(ii) in the case of France, I take it to be the German in‡ation rate. In the
cases of UK, Spain and Italy, I have generated the in‡ation gap using again
the HP …lter.
Notice that the choice of a time-varying target rate is sensible for the
analysis of asymmetries since some of the countries in the sample have ex-
perienced long disin‡ationary periods making it di¢cult to believe that a
constant long-term in‡ation rate was guiding monetary policy in the short-
run.
Table 1 reports the results for the Taylor(1993)’s rule speci…cations in
each country and the Euro-zone.
I begin with the Bundesbank, where the list of instruments includes a
constant term and the current value and four lags of the following variables:
in‡ation, output gap and interest rate (in the …rst column of each speci…ca-
tion) and two lags of the DM/$ real exchange rate change(second column),
and US interest rate (third column) which are variables included in the Xt
6Peersman and Smets(1999) examine the estimation error impact of the output gap on
the e¢cient feedback parameters in the performance of the Taylor rule.
7The annual target rate has been interpolated to a quarterly frequency.
9set. For the choice of k and p, I only report speci…cations with k=4 and
p=1 which turned out to have the best …t.8 Having added each of the Xt
variables one by one, I found that the speci…cation containing the US interest
rate was the best.9 The results in the third column point out that the degree
of persistence is very high (½ ¼ 0:71) and that the Bundesbank responds
to the in‡ation gap more than proportionally (¯1 =1 :79). The estimated
coe¢cient for the output gap is positive and weakly signi…cant (¯2 =0 :92):10
Given the estimate of the latter variable (¯3 =0 :27) I can interpret the policy
rule as a weighted average of the USA interest rate (0.27) and the baseline
policy rule (0.73).11
With regard to the Banque de France, the preferred speci…cation is the one
that contain the FF/DM real exchange rate change(second column) within
the Xt set.12 I only report speci…cations with k=4 and p=2 w h i c ht u r no u t
to have the best …t. One big di¤erence with the Bundesbank is that the Bank
of France has responded to the in‡ation gap less than proportionally (¯1 =
0:44); indicating the monetary policy stance has been fairly accommodating,
8I also used the variable ‘deviations of M3 with respect to its target level’ but it was
not signi…cant.
9Henceforth, I always choose the speci…cation with the lowest root mean square error.
10Smets(1998) argues that estimation error in the output gap may in part explain why
the actual central bank response to movements in the output gap is less than optimal
control exercises suggest.
11Note that the real interest rate target will be determined by the following expression:
i¤
t ¡ Et(¼t+k):
12The list of instruments includes a constant term and the current value and four lags
of the following variables: in‡ation, output gap and interest rate (in the …rst column of
each speci…cation) and two lags of the FF/DM real exchange rate change(second column),
and German interest rate (third column).
10with the increases in the short-term interest rates not being high enough
to keep the real interest rate from declining. Moreover the response to the
output gap is much weaker than in Germany although more statistically
signi…cant (¯2 =0 :32):
As for as the Bank of England is concerned, I report speci…cations with
k=1 and p=0 which turned out to have the best …t.13 The best speci…cation
is the one that contains German interest rate being the response to in‡ation
g a ps m a l l e rt h a nu n i t y( ¯1 =0 :82): As we know monetary policy in the
European countries appears to …ght in‡ation by following Bundesbank and
in‡ation has dropped from the mid-1980s. The expected result would not be
an accommodative monetary policy as in this case however we must take into
account that …nancial markets could force these markets to have high real
interest rates to maintain exchange rates. Clarida et al(1998) point out that
t h eB r i t i s hr e a lr a t e sw e r eh i g hb o t hi na b s o l u t et e r m sa n dr e l a t i v et ot h e
German rates. However, the response to the output gap is about the same
size as in Germany (¯2 =0 :89) and strongly signi…cant. Nevertheless, the
size of the estimated coe¢cient on the German interest rate is larger than in
France (¯3 =0 :58).
With reference to the Banco de España I report speci…cations with k=2
and p=0 which turned out to have the best …t.14 As it happened with the
13The list of instruments includes a constant term and the current value and four lags
of the following variables: in‡ation, output gap and interest rate (in the …rst column of
each speci…cation) and two lags of the `/DM real exchange rate change(second column),
and German interest rate (third column). I also used the variable ‘deviations of M3 with
respect to its target level’ but it was not signi…cant.
14The list of instruments includes a constant term and the current value and four lags of
11Bank of England the best speci…cation again is the one that includes the
German interest rate. The results are fairly similar to the ones found for
the British case with the response to the in‡ation gap being smaller than
unity (¯1 =0 :68): The same argument for the British case possibly applies
here.15 During the sample period of our analysis the real rates in Spain were
higher than in Germany. With regard to the response to the output gap, it
is also about the same size as in Germany and weakly signi…cant(¯2 =0 :84):
Finally, the size of the estimated coe¢cient on the German interest rate is
0.78 and I interpret again this monetary policy rule as a weighted average of
t h eG e r m a ni n t e r e s tr a t e( 0 . 8 7 )a n dt h eb a s e l i n ep o l i c yr u l e ( 0 . 1 3 ) .
As regards the Banca di Italia are similar to those obtained for the Bank
of England policy rule.16 I observe that the more statistically signi…cant
variable inside the Xt is the Lira/DM real exchange rate change. I report
speci…cations with k=4 and p=0 and the responses are 0.54 for the in‡ation
gap and 0.18 for the output gap.
the following variables: in‡ation, output gap and interest rate (in the …rst column of each
speci…cation) and two lags of the pts/DM real exchange rate change(second column), and
German interest rate (third column). A dummy variable in 1987 is needed to get stability
in the estimated model. This dummy can be justi…ed by the change in the monetary policy
instrumentation in Spain.
15This …nding should get more attention and further research is needed. Maybe this
result could be di¤erent if we had information on central banks’ in‡ation projections(see
Orphanides, 2001).
16The list of instruments includes a constant term and the current value and four lags of
the following variables: in‡ation, output gap and interest rate (in the …rst column of each
speci…cation) and two lags of the Lira/DM real exchange rate change(second column), and
German interest rate (third column).
12Finally, the policy rule for the Euro-zone has been estimated with k=4
and p=0 both without and with the Xt variables. In this case the best
speci…cation corresponds to the one that takes the Euro/$ real exchange rate
changes. The responses of the interest rate to in‡ation deviations (¯1 =1 :07)
and the output gap (¯2 =0 :35) are in line with those estimated for the
Bundesbank indicating that, with the possible exception of the turbulent
period around 1992-93, a Taylor rule fares well in predicting a short-term
intervention rate in the Euro-area.
In most of the speci…cations the J-test takes p-values above 0.05, non
rejecting the set of overidentifying restrictions. Figure 1A-F portrays the
…tted values of the chosen speci…cation in each country.17 It thus appears
that the models fairly well predict the evolution of the short-term interest
rate, particularly in the cases of Germany, France, Spain and the Euro-
zone18.
3 Extended Markov switching models for
aggregate and sectorial real GDP growth
including monetary policy shocks
In this section I present the econometric model which I apply to analyse
asymmetries in monetary policy e¤ects. Next, I introduce a brief explana-
17I chose the speci…cation with the lowest mean root squared error in the dynamic
forecast of the model.
18The mean root squared error for the chosen speci…cations are: Germany(0.75),
France(1.43), UK(2.50), Spain(1.43), Italy(5.11) and Euro-zone(1.60), respectively.
13tion of the basic aspects of the MS methodology in a multivariate extension
of the original univariate model (see Hamilton, 1989) and how the ‘state’
asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy can be observed by allowing monetary
policy shocks to a¤ect the output growth rate.
To observe the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy on output growth
I will follow Garcia and Schaller(1995), Kakes(2000), Dolado and Maria-
Dolores(2001) and Peersman and Smets(2000) in considering a multivariate
extension of the MS model. In these models, output growth is allowed to be
a¤ected by interest-rate shocks which is the measure I will choose to gauge
the stance of monetary policy. This monetary policy shocks are derived from
the term »t in equation (4) to obtain i.i.d disturbances.19 I only consider a
version of the extended model where the e¤ects of monetary policy on output
growth depend on the state of the economy at the time when policy action
was taken. Another possibility is to assume that these e¤ects are di¤erent
depending on the current state of the economy, rather than on the state at
t h et i m ew h e nt h es h o c kt o o kp l a c e . 20
Hamilton’s(1989) approach is based on the assumption that the actual
state of the economy, i.e., recession(r) or expansion(e), is determined by an
unobserved latent random variable which follows a Markov process. In the
original version of the MS methodology the average growth rate of GDP(¹)
is allowed to vary depending on whether the economy is expanding (¹e) or
recessing (¹r). The GDP growth is assumed to be determined by an AR(p)
19The term "t captures deviations of the actual interest rates from the rates that should
have prevailed according to the estimated rules. This term is not an i.i.d disturbance.
20Dolado and Maria-Dolores(2001) and Peersman and Smets check robustness in their
results using both methods and they always obtain similar results.
14process.
Thus, once the interest rate shocks have been obtained from the forward-
looking Taylor rule, I address whether there are asymmetric e¤ects of mone-
tary policy on output growth depending on the business cycle phase that the
economy was undergoing at the time the shock took place. For this purpose,
I estimate the following extended MS speci…cation.
¢yt = Á1¢yt¡1 + ::: + Áp¢yt¡p + ¹r(1 ¡ Á1 ¡ ::: ¡ Áp)+ (6)
¢¹(St ¡ Á1St¡1 ¡ ::: ¡ ÁpSt¡p)+¯or»t +¢ ¯oSt»t +
¯1r»t¡1 +¢ ¯1St¡1»t¡1 + ::: + ¯pr»t¡p +¢ ¯pSt¡p»t¡p + ¾´t;
where ¢y is the quarterly growth rate seasonally adjusted GDP, ¢¹ = ¹e ¡
¹r, St is the state variable and ´t is distributed N(0,1). ¢¯ = ¯e ¡ ¯r; and
¯r and ¯e are the coe¢cients on the shocks in recessions and expansions in
each country, respectively.
The state variable in the model, St, is assumed to follow a discrete-time

















pij =P r ( St = j=St¡1 = i); with
e X
j=r
pij =1for all i, (8)
15and pij is the probability of going from state i to state j (e.g. , pre is the prob-
ability of going from a recession to an expansion, etc.). Initially, we assume
that the transition probabilities are constant over time and are determined
by the following logistic distribution functions:
prr =P r ( St = r=St¡1 = r)=
exp(µr)
1+e x p ( µr)
; (9)
pee =P r ( St = e=St¡1 = e)=
exp(µe)
1+e x p ( µe)
; (10)
where µr and µe are the parameters that determine the probabilities of being
in a recession and in an expansion, respectively.
As Hamilton(1989) has shown, the above assumptions allow us to obtain
a sequence of joint conditional probabilities Pr(St = i;:::;St¡s = j=©t); which
are the probabilities that the GDP growth series is in state i or j (i, j = r,e) at
times t, t-1, until t-s respectively, conditioned by the information available
at time t. By adding those joint probabilities we can obtain the so-called
smoothed …lter probabilities, namely, the probabilities of being in state r or







Pr(St = i;:::;St¡s = j=©t) i,j = e,r. (11)
where ©t is a set information in period t. The smoothed …lter probabilities
provide information about the regime in which the series are most likely to
have been in time t at every point in the sample. Therefore, they turn out to
16be very useful tools for dating phase switches and will be reported for each
of the models estimated throughout the paper.
Table 2 shows the results obtained from the estimation of the MS model
in (6) with p=1for the following sample periods: 1978(2)-1998(4) for Ger-
many, 1978(2)-1998(4) for France, 1978(3)-1998(4) for UK, 1978(1)-1998(4)
for Spain, 1982(3)-1998(4) for Italy, and 1984(1)-2001(2) for the Euro-zone.21
The choice of one lag turns out to be appropriate to obtain serially uncorre-
lated residuals.22 T h e… r s tr e g i m ec o r r e s p o n d st oal o wg r o w t hp h a s ew i t ha
quarterly growth rate of 0.19%(0.80% annually) for Germany, 0.16%(0.64%
annually) for France, 0.17%(0.68% annually) for Spain, 0.26%(1.04% annu-
ally) for Italy and 0.24%(0.96% annually) for the Euro-zone.23 These results
imply that it is more appropriate to interpret that phase as one of mild
growth rather than as a proper recession in these countries. I only clearly
identify a recession phase in the British case with an annual growth rate
of -0.12%(-0.49% annually). The second regime, in turn, corresponds more
clearly to an expansion phase with a quarterly growth rate of 0.60%(2.40%
annually) for Germany, 0.50%(2.00% annually) for France, 0.48%(1.92% an-
nually) for UK, 0.41%(1.64% annually) for Spain, 0.81%(3.24% annually) for
Italy and 0.81%(3.24% annually) for the Euro-zone.
As regards the probabilities of remaining in each regime, they are esti-
21The data series in Germany are built considering the GDP growth in West Germany
from 1977 to 1993 and in the uni…ed Germany from 1994 to 1998.
22Moreover, when extending the maximum lag to pmax =4 ; the BIC lag length criterion
chooses p=1.
23I test the constant variance/mean-shift speci…cation against a linear AR(1) speci…ca-
tion using Hansen‘s(1992) approach, where linearity constitutes the null hypothesis. I …nd
a p-value of 0.04 rejecting linearity at the 5% level.
17mated to be 0.88, 0.81, 0.47, 0.81, 0.97 and 0.96 for a recession and 0.95,
0.97, 0.89, 0.93, 0.94 and 0.84 for an expansion in Germany, France, UK,
Spain, Italy and the Euro-zone, respectively. These probabilities imply mean
durations of 5.26 quarters in recessions and 20 quarters in expansions for
Germany.24 In Spain and Italy we obtain a similar mean duration for an
expansion, 14.28 and 16.67 quarters, respectively. The main divergence is in
the mean duration of a recession phase. The larger mild-growth phases are
in Italy (33.33 quarters) and the smaller in UK where we clearly identify a
recession phase. For the Euro-zone I obtain mean durations of 25 quarters for
mild-growth phases and 6.25 for expansions. These results are very similar
to the derived for Germany.
Figure 2(A,F) plots quarterly GDP growth rates in each country and
the …lter probabilities of being in an expansion. As can be observed in the
majority of the countries, the highest probabilities are those in the second
half of the 1980s, whilst the lowest probabilities correspond to the recession
in the …rst half of the 1990s.
Figure 3(A-F), in turn, depicts the GDP growth rate impulse response
function to a one-standard deviation increase in »t for the …ve countries
and the Euro-zone:25 It becomes clear that the e¤ects are much larger in
mild growth phases than in expansions. As I can see in all the countries the
monetary policy e¤ects are larger during recessions/mild-growth phases than
during expansions. The estimated coe¢cients for the monetary policy shocks
during booms are also signi…cant in the majority of the countries, except the
24Mean duration in state i is de…ned as 1/(1-pii), i=e,r.
25The dynamic simulations in the impulse-responses are based on one-period increase
in one-standard deviation in »t:
18UK and Italy. Indeed, the null hypothesis of symmetry (H0 : ¯ie = ¯ir)
is clearly rejected with a p-value of 0.04(for Germany), 0.02(for France),
0.005(for UK), 0.002(for Spain), 0.004(for Italy) and 0.01(for the Euro-zone)
In this framework I also proceed to analyse monetary policy transmis-
sion on sectors. There are at least two reasons why the sectorial analysis
may be useful. First, because it helps to ascertain how robust the results
obtained at the aggregate level are in sectors which may have undergone
more severe recessions than the mild growth phase found for total GDP in
the majority of the countries. Second, because …nding which sectors are
more likely to su¤er from ‘state’ asymmetries on the basis of their …nancial
characteristics it is an interesting exercise. For instance, the case could be
that sectors which can be expected to have more asymmetric information
problems (e.g. smaller …rms, bank dependent) respond stronger to mone-
tary policy(e.g. because of credit rationing). For this purpose, I split total
GDP into its four major components, namely, Agriculture(A), Manufactur-
ing(M), Construction(C) and Services(S). To give an idea of the importance
of value added in each sector relative to total GDP, I report the correspond-
ing GDP shares at both extremes of the sample period in each country.
In Germany(1977 and 1998): 1.45%-1.33% (A), 51.47%-30.45% (M), and
47.04%-68.22% (S).26 In France(1978 and 1998): 3.41%-3.36% (A), 23.48%-
23.90% (M), 7.44%-4.29% (C) and 65.64%-68.45% (S). In Italy(1982 and
1998): 3.70%-3.15% (A), 25.09%-24.47% (M), 6.95%-4.94% (C) and 64.25%-
26For the West Germany there is no data for the Construction sector. That is the reason
why we join this sector with Manufacturing. The data series are also built considering
the value added growth in each sector in the West Germany from 1977 to 1993 and in the
uni…ed Germany from 1994 to 1998.
1967.42% (S). In Spain(1977 and 1998): 9.8%-4.5% (A), 34.1%-29.6% (M),
7.1%-7.8% (C) and 49%-58.1% (S).27 France, Spain and Italy have a similar
sectorial structure. The exception being Germany where the Manufacturing
sector plays an important role and maintains an important share in GDP
even after the uni…cation. I do not repeat same analysis for the Euro-zone
because there is no available sectorial data.
Figures 4 to 7(A,E) show the value added growth rate in each sector in
each country together with the …lter probabilities of an expansion estimated
for the model in (6). Table 3 presents a summary of results, comprising the
estimates of the di¤erent growth rates in expansions and recessions (¹r and
¹e) and the mean durations in each phase (de and dr).28 Ic a no b s e r v eh o w
the di¤erence between average growth rates in expansions and recessions is
much larger in Agriculture and Construction than in the total economy and
the remaining two sectors in the majority of the countries. In particular, the
Construction sector undergoes severe recessions, observing quarterly growth
rates of -0.68%(France), -0.67% (UK), -0.24%(Spain) and -0.35%(Italy) un-
like what happens in Services where recession phases are better interpreted
as mild growth phases. I obtain a quarterly growth rate of 0.21%(Germany),
0.05%(France), 0.02%(UK), 0.17%(Spain) and 0.15%(Italy). As for Services,
given that it has the largest share in GDP, it is not surprising that its regime
shifts (probabilities and durations) are found to be similar to those obtained
for the aggregate case. As regards the transition probabilities, the probabil-
ity of moving from a recession to an expansion is lower than the probability
27I cannot o¤er similar results for the UK because the data for the GDP and value
a d d e di ne a c hs e c t o ra r eam e r ei n d e x .
28The results of the complete estimated models are not reported to save space.
20of moving in the opposite direction for all the sectors, as it was the case with
the total GDP.
With reference to Manufacturing, I show the impulse response function
of the value added growth rate to one-standard deviation increase in »t in
Figure 9(A-E):29 I observe how the monetary policy e¤ects are larger during
recessions than during expansions in three countries. This e¤ect is more
pronounced in Germany30 and the UK. In the UK the expansion coe¢cients
are not signi…cant. With regard to Spain the monetary policy e¤ects are
weak in recession phases.
With respect to Construction, I only …nd evidence in Spain and the UK
where I reject the null hypothesis of symmetry with a p-value of 0.01 and 0.03,
respectively.31 Figure 10(A-D) portrays the impulse response function of the
value added growth rates in this sector to one-standard deviation increase in
»t: In France and Italy I observe the opposite, larger e¤ects during expansions
than recessions.
In the Services sector I …nd evidence in all the countries. In France,
the coe¢cients in expansion are not signi…cant though in the rest of the
countries they are statistically signi…cant.32 This is the expected result due
29The results of the tests for Manufacturing and Services are not reported to save space.
H o w e v e r ,t h e ya r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
30This evidence is in agreement with the results in Mojon, Smets and Vermoulen(2000)
where the impact e¤ect of a change in the short-term interest rate on the investment-capital
ratio is larger in Italy and Germany in Manufacturing …rms’ investment.
31I do not report results for Germany because I do not have any data.
32The results of the tests for Services are not reported to save space but they are very
similar to the results obtained for the aggregate case. However, they are available upon
request.
21to the obtained evidence in the aggregate level and because this sector is the
most important as a percentage of GDP. Figure 11(A-E) shows the impulse
response function of the value added growth rates in this sector to one-
standard deviation increase in »t:
The fact that generally I tend to …nd stronger asymmetries in Services
(in the …ve countries) and Construction (Germany, UK and Spain) could be
somewhat justi…ed in terms of the strength with which tight credit conditions
may impinge on their cyclical behaviour. For example, small …rms represent
a larger share of total …rms in Services and they are likely to face larger
barriers to outside …nance than larger …rms do; for example the …xed costs
associated with issuing public traded bonds may be much more important for
small …rms(see Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). Likewise, mortgage loans in the
Construction sector are generally …nanced by banks which tend to transmit
changes in the intervention rate onto mortgage rates rather quickly and in this
way, will exacerbate the e¤ects of debt overhang during recessions. Mojon,
Smets and Vermeulen(2000) obtain interesting results about this topic for
Germany, France, Italy and Spain using Manufacturing …rm’s investment.
They …nd that the investment of smaller …rms is more sensitive to monetary
policy changes than the investment of larger …rms and …rms with a better
than average cash-‡ow situation.
4 E¤ects of Monetary Policy on State Switches
Whereas in the previous sections I allowed for state dependence in the e¤ects
of interest rate shocks on output growth, the transition probabilities from
22one phase to another were not allowed to depend on those shocks. Thus,
while I was able to test whether shocks had di¤erent incremental e¤ects on
output in each state, I was not able to examine the issue of whether those
shocks might have a further e¤ect on output growth by directly a¤ecting
the probability of a state switch. In this section, I address this issue by
allowing those probabilities to depend directly on the shocks.33 Hence, the
logit functions (9) and (10) are replaced by:
prr =P r ( St = r=St¡1 = r)=
exp(µor + µ1r»t¡1)
1+e x p ( µor + µ1r»t¡1)
(12)
pee =P r ( St = e=St¡1 = e)=
exp(µ0e + µ1e»t¡1)
1+e x p ( µoe + µ1e»t¡1)
(13)
where only one lag of »t has been chosen in (12) and (13) to keep the num-
ber of parameters manageable.34 Further, as in García and Schaller(1995),
to isolate the e¤ect of the shocks from the linear e¤ect examined above, I
constrain the latter to be zero. Thus, I estimate the MS speci…cation (6)
without monetary policy shocks as explanatory variables. Notice that since
the probability of remaining in a recession (expansion) is increasing in the
µir(µie) parameters, I should expect µir to be positive and µie to be negative
when considering a shock that raises interest rates. In other words, an in-
crease in interest rates reduces the probability of remaining in an expansion
and increases the probability of remaining in a recession.
33The maximization algorithm with variable transition probabilities is considered in
Filardo(1994)
34Moreover, when trying speci…cations with more lags, some coe¢cients were not sig-
ni…cant.
23The results of the di¤erent models for aggregate and sectorial GDP are
o¤ered in Tables 4-7, where it can be observed that the signs of the µ co-
e¢cients are broadly in agreement with the above interpretation. Thus, a
positive interest rate shock increases prr and decreases pee while the converse
happens with a negative shock:
To ascertain the e¤ects of interest rate shocks on the transition proba-
bilities I propose a similar experiment to the one undertaken by Garcia and
Schaller(1995) and Dolado and María-Dolores(2001), who use changes in the
Fed Funds rate and the marginal interest rate of the Bank of Spain to il-
lustrate those e¤ects in the US and Spain, respectively. Suppose that the
central banks were able to have produced a positive (contractionary) interest
r a t es h o c ko f 1 0 0b a s i sp o i n t si no n eq u a r t e r ( f r o mtt ot - 1 )w i t hw h i c h»t
appears to a¤ect prr and pee in (12) and (13). Then, the question is: How
would that shock a¤ect the transition probability from an expansion to a
recession?. Likewise, if instead I considered a negative (expansionary) shock
of the identical magnitude, how would it a¤ect the probability of a converse
switch?.
Tables 8-11 show the estimated changes for total GDP and its four compo-
nents in each country, based on the estimates obtained for the µ coe¢cients
in Tables 4-7. I report the changes in per (pre) when a positive(negative)
interest rate shock is considered35.
As for the aggregate GDP model, I …nd that before the string of pos-
itive shocks takes place, the probabilities of going from an expansion to
35Agriculture & Hunting results are not reported in this model to save space but they
are available upon request.
24a recession (per) are 0.21(Germany), 0.37(France), 0.44(UK), 0.48(Spain)
and 0.44(Italy). These probabilities result in 0.39(Germany), 0.64(France),
0.47(UK), 0.49(Spain), 0.44(Italy) and 0.37(Euro-zone), after the shock has
taken place. With regard to the e¤ects of the negative shock, we …nd that
the probability of moving from a recession to an expansion (pre) increases
from: 0.38 to 0.62(Germany), 0.38 to 0.64(France), 0.43 to 0.70(UK), 0.48
to 0.81(Spain), 0.41 to 0.93(Italy) and 0.42 to 0.77 (Euro-zone).
Next, I introduce a summary of the obtained results with reference to the
sectorial evidence. I only focus on Manufacturing, Construction and Services
sectors. I …nd that the increase in the previous transition probability (pre)
in Manufacturing sector is larger in France(from 0.38 to 0.64), UK (from
0.33 to 0.64) and Italy(from 0.49 to 0.67) than in the rest of countries. In
the Construction sector the largest increase in pre is in France(from 0.38 to
0.62), UK(from 0.37 to 0.68) and Spain(from 0.47 to 0.88). Finally, with
regard to the Services sector we can observe how all countries experiment a
big increase in the probability of moving from a recession to an expansion.
Summing up, the overall evidence presented in this section is in line with
the results previously obtained, namely, ‘state’ asymmetries of monetary
policy. Such results, which this time stem from the potential direct e¤ects
of policy shocks on the transition probabilities are present at the aggregate
level and seem to be particularly relevant in Construction and Services.
255 Conclusions
In this paper I have researched asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy shocks
on output growth in …ve countries and the Euro-zone. This type of asym-
metry is the so-called ‘state’ asymmetries of monetary policy, according to
which the e¤ects of policy actions on output may depend on the current
phase/state of the business cycle that the economy is undergoing. Further-
more, the possibility that policy shocks may a¤ect the transition probabilities
of one phase to another has also been addressed. My analysis is undertaken
both at the aggregate and sectorial levels with the aim of identifying sectors
in which ‘state’ asymmetries are larger.
I …nd strong evidence that monetary policy shocks, measured as shocks
to the short-term interest rate obtained from a forward-looking Taylor rule,
have signi…cantly larger e¤ects during a recession/mild growth phase than
during an expansion phase for …ve European countries and the Euro-zone.
The analysis at the sectorial level, comprising the four main components of
GDP, reinforces the above-mentioned results when I consider the results in
Construction and Services, two sectors which depend heavily on bank lend-
ing and in which, therefore, the credit channel of the monetary transmission
mechanism is likely to be most relevant in explaining their cyclical ‡uctua-
tions.
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3 :Variations in DM/$ real exchange rate(second column); US interest rate(third column)
¯
FR
3 :Variations FF/DM real exchange rate(second column);German interest rate(third column)
¯
UK
3 : `=DM real exchange rate changes(second column);German interest rate(third column)
¯
SP
3 : pta/DM real exchange rate changes(second column);German interest rate(third column)
¯
IT
3 :Lira/DM real exchange rate changes(second column);German interest rate(third column)
¯
EZ
3 :Euro/$ real exchange rate changes(second column);USA interest rate(third column)
Note: t-value in parentheses.p; is the p-value of the J-test for overidentifying restrictionsTable 2
Models for GDP growth
Dependent variable Ayt

































































































dr 5.26 8.33 1.88 5.26 33.33 25
de 20 33.33 9.09 14.28 16.67 6.25
Log-Likelihood 40.97 13.22 32.42 105.07 18.97 84.04
Note: t -values in parenthesisTable 3: Models for Sectoral GDP growth
Agriculture & Hunting





















dr￿quarters￿ 1.66 2.56 5.26 11.11 1.58
de￿quarters￿ 2.44 1.16 9.09 7.14 25
Manufacturing





















dr￿quarters￿ 3.45 5.68 8.33 5.88 6.66
de￿quarters￿ 25 7.69 33.33 33.33 20
Construction

















dr￿quarters￿ - 2.17 5.88 7.14 4.17
de￿quarters￿ - 33.33 33.33 14.28 20
Services





















dr￿quarters￿ 3.57 2.63 5.26 1.63 2.86
de￿quarters￿ 8.33 3.33 33.33 5.88 7.69
Note: t -values in parenthesisTable 4
Markov Switching Models with variable transition probabilities in GDP growth

































































































Log-Likelihood 40.97 13.22 32.42 105.07 18.97 42.13
Note: t-value in parenthesisTable 5
Markov Switching Models with variable transition probabilities in Manufacturing

















































































Log-Likelihood 44.12 11.96 13.67 26.77 18.74
Note: t-value in parenthesis
Table 6: MSM with variable transition probabilities in Construction

































































Log-Likelihood 54.35 57.97 6.53 13.63
Note: t-value in parenthesisTable 7: MSM with variable transition probabilities in Services
























































































Log-Likelihood 37.22 74.95 44.24 18.04 70.18
Note: t-value in parenthesisTable 8
Effects of interest rates shocks on transition probabilities in GDP
a/ ut = ?100b.p.(t to t+1)







































Effects of interest rates shocks on transition probabilities in Manufacturing
a/ ut = ?100b.p.(t to t+1)
































GE ~Germany;FR~France;UK ~United Kingdom;SP ~Spain;IT ~ItalyTable 10
Effects of interest rates shocks on transition probabilities in Construction
a/ ut = ?100b.p.(t to t+1)



























Effects of interest rates shocks on transition probabilities in Services
a/ ut = ?100b.p.(t to t+1)
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Figure 1F: Taylor rule in the Euro-zoneFigure 2: Hamilton Model for the GDP growth and estimated probabilities of an expansion
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1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999Figure 3: GDP growth Impulse- Response functions to an unanticipated
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3E: Italy 3F: Euro-zoneFigure 4: Hamilton Model for the Value Added growth in Agriculture and estimated probabilities of an expansion
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1984 1987 1990 1993 1996Figure 5: Hamilton Model for the Value Added growth in Manufacturing and estimated probabilities of an expansion
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1984 1987 1990 1993 1996Figure 6: Hamilton Model for the Value Added growth in Construction and estimated probabilities of an expansion
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1984 1987 1990 1993 1996Figure 7: Hamilton Model for the Value Added growth in Services and estimated probabilities of an expansion
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1984 1987 1990 1993 1996Figure 8: Agriculture Impulse-Response



































































Figure 9: Manufacturing Impulse- Response
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Figure 9E: ItalyFigure 10: Construction Impulse- Response



















































Figure 11: Services Impulse- Response functions
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Figure 11E: Italy